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e use of language can be a potent site of postcolonial resistance, de-
spite—and, perhaps, because of—how often it has been used as a tool 
of imperialist stratification. e way a person speaks, including charac-
teristics such as accent and diction, is generally held to express identity 
and to mark a certain social position; yet, language itself is fluid, trans-
mittable, transmutable. Language is often the first of the trappings of 
imperialism that the colonized are forced to adopt; nevertheless, they are 
intended never fully to appropriate it, but rather to speak in a way that 
is, in the terms of Homi Bhabha, “almost the same but not quite” (126
emphasis original). By speaking the colonial language while retaining an 
accent and a diction that differentiate them from the colonizers, post-
colonial subjects are supposed to reflect the colonial presence without 
appropriating it. us, postcolonial subjects represent the power of the 
colonizer while signaling that they themselves are outside of it, subor-
dinated to it. 
e subordination described here is a product of a colonial system that 
invests in national and ethnic identity categories designed to reinforce 
a social hierarchy even as those categories are presented as natural or es-
sential. is system must hide its arbitrary nature, including the fixed 
categories and the hierarchical social order that it constructs; its power 
relies upon its uncritical and tacit acceptance. An opportunity for re-
sistance, however, appears in a certain dynamic where variation can call 
attention to the silent hegemony and thereby robs it of its uncontested 
status. is dynamic has been described by Bhabha in his theory of 
mimicry, but it has also been explicated more thoroughly by sociologist 
Pierre Bourdieu in his extensive study of doxa, the set of beliefs and cus-
toms that enjoy implicit hegemony, and doxa’s disruption by heterodoxy.
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e relationship between the work of the two theorists will be examined 
in this article with particular attention paid to the ways Bourdieu can 
illuminate Bhabha’s work and prove very useful to this analysis and to 
postcolonial studies more broadly. e argument I take up here is that 
through parodic performances, which call into question both the neat-
ness of putative ethnic identity categories and their easy signification 
through linguistic markers, postcolonial subjects can problematize the 
assumptions of the hegemonic system, expose its arbitrary construction, 
and thereby weaken it. is article examines the ways Jackson Phillip, a 
character in Derek Walcott’s 1978 play Pantomime, subverts dominant 
axioms regarding ethnic identity. 
Walcott himself is widely considered to be masterful both in the el-
egance of his verbal expression and in its political critique. Seamus 
Heaney observes, “Walcott possesses English more deeply and sono-
rously than most of the English themselves. … And in spite of the sheen 
off those lines, I suspect he is not so much interested in the ‘finish’ of 
his work as in its drive” (307). For the purposes of this argument, then, 
I read Walcott’s virtuosity as mindful, mainly concerned with the action 
of his work, with its exposure and disruption of the reader’s assump-
tions, particularly those regarding ethnicity. Biodun Jeyifo introduces us 
to some of Pantomime’s main engagements to this end: 
What powers [Jackson’s iconoclastic] impulse is the thinking 
that ‘white’ domination is not only political and socio-eco-
nomic; it is also, or aspires to, total effectivity in the naming of 
things, in signifying and explanatory systems. In other words, 
it seeks to be an epistemic order of control and manipulation. 
… Jackson Philip [sic] in particular deploy[s] a surfeit of bril-
liant, witty conceits and tropes to debunk this epistemic, no-
menclatural hegemony. (378)
Concerns about language come to the fore in the work of Pierre 
Bourdieu, whose analyses of power dynamics within societies, and of 
their perpetuation through hegemonic worldviews, are of urgent rel-
evance—especially as they suggest how these dynamics can be resisted 
and even disabled. Yet, inexplicably, there has been relatively little writ-
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ten to date that uses Bourdieu’s tools to analyze postcolonial literature. 
is article follows in the footsteps of those few earlier works which 
have done so, such as Vivek Dhareshwar’s discussion of the habitus in 
colonial power dynamics, and Anthony Arnove’s reading of the language 
debate within African literature in terms of the struggle for symbol-
ic capital within a field. Here I also aim to engage a broader range of 
Bourdieu’s concepts and to consider in depth their relation to the work 
of postcolonial theory. As Neil Lazarus has recently confirmed in his cri-
tique of Said’s writings on the role of the intellectual, Bourdieu offers 
a particularly useful, apt, and compelling set of tools for the analysis 
of ideology and power in social relations. e theoretical focus of this 
article aims to pave the way for further research applying Bourdieuian 
concepts in this field.
First, however, to avoid confusion among some of the main purposes 
that language use by postcolonial subjects may serve, it is important to 
draw one key distinction concerning the sort of language use treated 
here. Perhaps the most obvious purpose, which this article will not be 
addressing, is the one that Gabriel Okara indicates when he asks, “why
shouldn’t there be a Nigerian or West African English which we can use 
to express our own ideas, thinking and philosophy in our own way” 
(15–16). In other words, this article does not take up concepts of lan-
guage for authentic communication of the self. Chinua Achebe points 
to this usage when he wonders whether English could “carry the weight 
of [his] African experience” (103). In short, I will not discuss the use of 
language as an expressive medium.
Another important issue that this article does not address in depth 
is the use of language to identify oneself with a certain group. Chantal 
Zabus explains this use of language, with specific reference here to the 
function of Pidgin in West Africa:
When the role of Pidgin is not communicative, it is identifi-
cative or disidentificative. In other words, the locutor speaks 
Pidgin not only to be understood but also to convey some-
thing extralinguistic. A character’s utterance in a novel may 
therefore be interpreted as the performing of ‘an act of identity’ 
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or ‘speech-act’ whereby the character reveals his/her search for 
identity and for a social role. (78–79)
Zabus goes on to observe that a character may also alternate between 
different registers for a similarly identificative purpose: “a character may 
code-switch from Pidgin to S[tandard] E[nglish] and vice versa depend-
ing on the need to establish his/her identity and allegiance to a social 
group. e use of a register will therefore depend on the locutor’s audi-
ence and the social arena in which the locutor finds him/herself ” (79). 
is sort of speech both affiliates the speaker with a particular group and 
expresses an inhabitable identity. 
ere is another mode of language to consider, which will be the focus 
of this article: namely, performance for a hegemonic audience. In this 
case, language is deliberately manipulated in a mode quite similar—at 
first glance—to the identificative model Zabus describes. Here, its key 
distinction from that model lies in its parodic or otherwise critical prop-
erties: it is not authentic expression, but utterance, which poses, or is 
play-acted, with the intent of highlighting the assumptions of its audi-
ence. A subject’s use of language for this specific purpose is complex in 
terms of its dynamics and ramifications, and it has the potential to be 
powerfully subversive. In the remainder of the article I will explore this 
citational, parodic, disruptive mode of speech. 
Walcott’s Pantomime depicts the relationship between Jackson Phillip, 
a retired Trinidadian calypso singer, and his employer Harry Trewe, a 
British expatriate hotel owner. ese are the only two characters on 
stage, and the majority of the exchange, set over the course of one day, 
revolves around a reverse rendition of Robinson Crusoe, which they 
are considering performing for the hotel guests’ entertainment. One of 
the most striking features of the play, as quickly becomes apparent, is 
Jackson’s use of language. He constantly shifts his accent, tone, and dic-
tion, and in doing so effectively satirizes the hierarchy of identity catego-
ries generally connoted by those linguistic features.
roughout much of the play, Jackson employs what British speakers 
would probably regard as “proper” or “standard” English in articulate and 
elegant ways. is helps to highlight the irony when at other points he de-
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liberately uses stereotypical or even exaggerated forms of Creole diction. 
When Jackson intentionally uses Creole speech his performance calls at-
tention to Harry’s assumptions and expectations of West Indian speech 
and identity. Since a speaker’s accent and diction are generally assumed 
to be fixed as well as be expressive of a set category of ethnic identity, 
Jackson’s violation of this first assumption calls the second into question 
as well. Moreover, given that his audience remains the same throughout, 
attributing his code-switching to the sort of situational strategies which 
Zabus explains is out of the question. Indeed, his manipulation of Creole 
enhances the elegance of Jackson’s expression, and he uses this form as 
well to make trenchant points. An example of this can be seen in the fol-
lowing excerpt from his discussion of the post-imperialist era:
JACKSON: And that is why all them Pakistani and West 
Indians in England, all them immigrant Fridays driving you all 
so crazy. And they go keep driving you crazy till you go mad. 
In that sun that never set, they’s your shadow, you can’t shake 
them off. (137)
In passages like this, Jackson’s strategic mockery works on multiple 
levels. His statement “that sun that never set” mimics the well-know 
British imperialist proclamation. Furthermore, I suggest that his claim 
also highlights what the British would perceive to be problems of colo-
nization: they are not able to control or terminate their encounter with 
the colonized, and they fear appropriation or usurpation of “their” ter-
ritory by the colonized. Jackson simultaneously represents this “threat” 
linguistically by voicing his analysis in the diction of the colonized 
group who, according to imperialist norms, should not be speaking on 
this level.
Jackson’s satiric code-switching likewise helps us to appreciate his use 
of stereotypically British diction. For example, shortly after the above 
passage, Jackson is arguing with Harry over the play. Suddenly he as-
sumes a sarcastic condescending tone that mimics a British director:
JACKSON: Mr. Trewe. Now look, you know, I am doing you a 
favor…. Now I know that there is nobody there, but there is an 
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audience, so the sooner Robinson Crusoe puts on his clothes, 
then the better and happier we will all be…. I am going to look 
up into the sky. You will, please, make the sea-bird noises…. I 
will kill you, take off your skin, make a parasol and a hat, and 
after that, then I promise you that I will remember the song. 
And I will sing it to the best of my ability. (139)
is unexpected and out-of-bounds mimicry challenges any uncon-
scious assumption that the white British speaker is the (only) “proper” 
owner/operator of British diction. It also begins to problematize our 
notion of the force and legitimacy of this form as “standard.” 
Jackson pushes his manipulation of language further than that in 
complicating our concepts of coherent linguistic patterns, and by pro-
nouncing speech in demotic West Indian diction with a British accent. 
In this excerpt he is arguing about how long his restroom break will be:
JACKSON: (in exaggerated British accent) I go try and make 
it back in five, bwana.1 … I saw a sign once in a lavatory in 
Mobile, Alabama. COLORED. But it didn’t have no time 
limit. Funny, eh? (147)
By mixing up accent and diction, Jackson mocks the ability of either to 
express a coherent identity.
Finally, Jackson accomplishes one of his most dramatic feats of mim-
icry when he holds up a portrait of Harry’s British ex-wife, and adopts 
her position linguistically. at is, he plays her part in the ensuing con-
versation. Surprisingly, Harry, who had responded only with discomfort 
or exasperation to most of Jackson’s speech-play up until this point, 
finds his performance so compelling that he engages with Jackson quite 
as though it were with his ex-wife even stop when Jackson drops the 
photograph altogether. Nor, it seems, is Harry bothered when Jackson 
periodically breaks back into his own voice and into Creole diction:
JACKSON: (weeping) I love you, Harold. I love you, and I 
loved him, too. Forgive me, O God, please, please forgive me 
… (As himself) So how it happen? Murder? A accident?
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HARRY: (to the photograph) Love me? You loved me so 
much you used to get drunk and you … ah, ah, what’s the use? 
What’s the bloody use? (Wipes his eyes. Pause.) (149)
Jackson’s effective impersonation of another specific individual, and one 
of a different sex as well as ethnicity, only troubles our conception of the 
relationship between speech and the speaker further. 
As an introduction to the structural relationship between putative 
identity categories and the dynamics of domination to which they are 
linked, feminist theorist and philosopher Sally Haslanger steers us away 
from essentialism and points us instead to the central role of power in 
these configurations. She explains 
As I see it, the core phenomenon to be addressed is the pat-
tern of social relations that constitute certain social classes as 
racially/sexually dominant and others as racially/sexually sub-
ordinate; norms, symbols, and identities are gendered or raced 
derivatively, by reference to the social relations that constitute 
the relevant hierarchy of social classes. (5)
So, the significance of social categories derives from social relations and 
is then imputed to human subjects, rather than originating in them. In 
other words, whether a certain commodity, profession, or tendency is 
predominantly associated with men or women for example, it primarily 
refers to the social system in which women and “femininity” are clas-
sified as subordinate to men and “masculinity.” e subsequently pro-
duced cohesion of gender as an identity category may be read as a way 
to stabilize this inequality.
Within the postcolonial context, according to critic Graham Huggan, 
this process of stabilizing the power dynamics of identity can be revealed 
by its recapitulation through mimicry on the part of the colonized 
subject: it disturbs the “naturalness” of the premises of the hierarchy. 
Huggan claims, “by showing the relationship between metropolitan and 
colonial cultures to be based on changing strategies of domination and 
coercion rather than on the static comparison of ‘essential’ attributes, 
mimicry may paradoxically destabilize even as it reinforces” (644). is 
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subversive mimicry is evident in Jackson’s speech, in that it troubles not 
only the hierarchical arrangement of identity categories by the colonizer, 
but also the very dependence of colonialism upon these categories in the 
first place. According to Paula Burnett, colonialism’s dependence on cat-
egorical separation is critical. She lauds Walcott for his “perception that 
the most secure counter to the binary discourse of empire that deploys 
alterity to justify material exploitation is not a different binary discourse 
but one that transcends such classifications altogether” (129).
Having established that Walcott’s Jackson rejects binary categories, we 
can now turn to Bourdieu for an alternative way to understand binary 
power dynamics. 
Feminist and literary theorist Toril Moi draws a distinction, similar 
to Haslanger’s, about the construction and subsequent perception of 
gender. Her analysis introduces us to a Bourdieuian apparatus: “While 
the invocation of biology allows the social construction of sexual dif-
ference to appear motivated or ‘natural,’ its real function is to mask the 
true, socially produced power relations between the sexes, to present 
social gender divisions as doxic, that is to say, as that which cannot be 
questioned” (282). What Moi refers to here is Bourdieu’s concept of 
the doxa, which he defines as “the class of that which is taken for grant-
ed…the sum total of the theses tacitly posited on the hither side of all 
inquiry, which appear as such only retrospectively, when they come to 
be suspended practically” (Outline of a eory of Practice 168). Doxic 
beliefs are understood and accepted as having no alternatives, no com-
petitors, not least because they are never introduced except as always al-
ready axiomatic. ey generally have no point of introduction at which 
they could be held up to debate but are inherited imperceptibly as the 
legacy of “our” culture. In other words, they form the foundations upon 
which our worldview is based, and we are often not even explicitly aware 
of believing them.2
To focus more directly on how these theories can elucidate our read-
ing of Pantomime, consider the case of doxic ethnic/national/class cat-
egories, as denoted by subjects’ use of language, within the postcolonial 
context. A strong argument can be made that just as bodily features 
are taken to signal one’s place within a hierarchy of socially construct-
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ed genders or races, language (including accent, diction, and so forth) 
is likewise interpreted as a marker of one’s place within a hierarchy of 
socially constructed ethnicities or classes. Using language as an indi-
cator of status distracts from the fact that the real basis of hierarchi-
cal structures lie more in power differentials than in difference per se.
And indeed, within postcolonial studies it is understood that “language 
becomes the medium through which a hierarchical structure of power 
is perpetuated, and the medium through which conceptions of ‘truth,’ 
‘order,’ and ‘reality’ become established” (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin 
7). Here, the authors refer particularly to the notions of “standard” and 
“substandard” forms of a language, as well as to the way that variations 
on usage, accent, and slang are codified according to this “structure of 
power.” 
Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin go on to claim, however, that “[s]uch 
power is rejected in the emergence of an effective post-colonial voice” 
(7). is bold statement presumably indicates the postcolonial speaker’s 
potential to disrupt the metropolitan colonizer’s monopoly on language 
use and authority. Yet whether every “post-colonial voice” is effective in 
this way, or even intends to be so, should not be taken for granted. is 
question mainly depends on whether, as Bourdieu proposes, the post-
colonial subject accomplishes a problematization of the hidden axioms 
involved in the hegemonic doxa. As Moi points out, “to be a member 
of a disadvantaged minority within a given institution or field in no 
way guarantees that one will develop a revolutionary or oppositional 
consciousness” (292). Indeed, there can be mimetic responses that are 
inherently complicit and that support the dominant system, which is 
often opposed to the interests of the subject. “For the paradox is that 
members of minority groups who do succeed in such a system are at 
least as likely to identify with it as the enabling cause of their own suc-
cess as to turn against its unjust distribution of symbolic capital” (Moi 
292). It is possible for these subjects to embrace the ways that the social 
system transfigures them and to turn a blind eye to its injustices. Such a 
response may be may be conceived of as a kind of mimesis that involves 
the subject’s active divestment of his or her original social position, iden-
tity, and markers. 
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According to Bourdieu’s definition of the field, or the arena in which 
any specific type of power is negotiated, this sort of divestment to some 
extent may be considered a necessary sacrifice to the struggle. Bourdieu 
characterizes the field as “an area, a playing field, a field of objective rela-
tions among individuals or institutions competing for the same stakes” 
(Sociology in Question 133). And, continuing with the metaphor of ath-
letic competition, he specifies that “the precondition for entry to the 
field is recognition of the values at stake and therefore recognition of the 
limits not to be exceeded on pain of being excluded from the game. It 
follows that the internal struggle can only lead to partial revolution that 
can destroy the hierarchy but not the game itself ” (134). e revolution 
can change who is in which position, but it cannot change the presence 
of the hierarchy itself. He goes on to note that, “the opposition between 
[dominant and dominated] constantly changes in content but remains 
structurally identical” (135). But like many fields of competition that 
wrestle for social capital, the contest is rigged. In effect, the colonized 
are forced to compete with the British for Britishness and its attendant 
prestige; yet, as in all fixed games, the prize purports to be attainable. In 
any event, the nature of competition entails that the competitors who 
play by the rules are significantly constrained from effecting substantial 
critique or change. is would confirm our reading of Jackson, who 
does not seem to be interested in such compliance, as an “effective post-
colonial voice.” He is fully aware of the injustices of the system, and, 
because he is not committed to competing within it, he is able to effec-
tively distinguish himself from it, and to gain enough critical distance to 
achieve a potent critique. 
Without this sort of radical critique, the agents who act within the 
bounds of hegemonic discourses and constructs can be “overtaken” by 
them, and thus perpetuate them more or less uncritically, as Bourdieu 
explains:
Because [the agent’s] actions and works are the product of a 
modus operandi of which he is not the producer and has no 
conscious mastery, they contain an ‘objective intention,’ as the 
Scholastics put it, which always outruns his conscious inten-
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tions. e schemes of thought and expression he has acquired 
are the basis for the intentionless invention of regulated impro-
visation. Endlessly overtaken by his own words, with which 
he maintains a relation of ‘carry and be carried,’ as Nicolaï 
Hartmann put it, the virtuoso finds in the opus operatum new 
triggers and new supports for the modus operandi from which 
they arise, so that his discourse continuously feeds off itself like 
a train bringing along its own rails. (Outline 79) 
e values and mores of a culture tend to self-perpetuate, and in the 
case of imperialism, it can be argued that the very fabric of an impe-
rialist culture—language, imagery, dress, customs—implicitly privilege 
the imperial, even when transplanted to a new environment. Ngugi wa 
iong’o’s well-known thesis that language “carries” the culture from 
which it originated, and that, more specifically, “an oppressor language 
inevitably carries racist and negative images of the conquered nation” 
(Moving the Centre 35), provides an excellent example. Jackson manages 
to escape this vortex, however, largely because his awareness of the alter-
natives to, as well as the inconsistencies and poorly grounded assump-
tions of the hegemonic worldview disrupts its doxic nature, at least as 
far as he and his audiences are concerned. In subtle as well as sensational 
ways, he “poses the question which the doxic experience of the social 
world excludes by definition—the question of the (particular) condi-
tions making that experience possible” (Outline 3).
Bhabha’s concept of mimicry may be useful in understanding the 
means by which Jackson affectively questions the doxa. Mimicry’s com-
plex dynamics involve both the desire of the colonizer “for a reformed, 
recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but 
not quite” (126), and the agency of the colonized to reflect and subvert 
that desire. Bhabha posits that by recapitulating the messages, desires, 
and authority of the colonizer, but doing so ironically and incompletely, 
the subversive desire of the postcolonial subject “articulates those dis-
turbances of cultural, racial, and historical differences that menace the 
narcissistic demand of colonial authority. It is a desire that reverses ‘in 
part’ the colonial appropriation by now producing a partial vision of the 
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colonizer’s presence” (129).3 In other words, mimicry disrupts the colo-
nizer’s monopoly on representation.
e agency involved in this intervention into the field of represen-
tation and desire normally dominated by the metropolitan gaze may 
remind us of the following dynamic set forth by Jacques Lacan: 
Only the subject—the human subject, the subject of the desire 
that is the essence of man—is not, unlike the animal, entirely 
caught up in this imaginary capture. He maps himself in it. 
How? In so far as he isolates the function of the screen and 
plays with it. Man, in effect, knows how to play with the mask 
as that beyond which there is the gaze. (107)4
is is precisely what Jackson is doing when he “plays with” his own 
appearances on the postcolonial stage. By playing with his appearance 
he calls attention to the metropolitan gaze, and its desire, at the same 
time that he displaces it by introducing the implication of his own gaze. 
According to Lacan’s hypothesis, he is the artist whose work is an uncon-
ventional self-portrait, a representation of self as viewer, not as object, 
ultimately emphasizing his own subjectivity: 
But when a human subject is engaged in making a picture of 
himself, is putting into operation something that has as its 
centre the gaze, what is taking place? In the picture, the artist, 
we are told by some, wishes to be a subject, and the art of 
painting is to be distinguished from all others in that, in the 
work, it is as subject, as gaze, that the artist intends to impose 
himself on us. (100)
ough Lacan speaks here specifically about painting rather than per-
formance, I argue that his analysis holds. His description of the energet-
ic break with the gaze of the metropolitan in favor of emphasizing one’s 
own agency is what Walcott seems to indicate when he says, “where his-
tory is being made now, in these islands, is…in the deepening stream 
of the way we are now learning to think. To see ourselves, not as others 
see us, but with all the possibilities of the new country we are making” 
(“Society” 15).
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e distinction between representation of the self as seer and as seen 
is crucial for interpreting Bhabha’s contention that 
mimicry conceals no presence or identity behind its mask: it 
is not what Césaire describes as “colonization-thingification” 
behind which there stands the essence of the présence Africaine.
e menace of mimicry is its double vision which in disclosing 
the ambivalence of colonial discourse also disrupts its author-
ity. (129 emphasis original) 
For our purposes, it is not necessary to argue that no “presence or identi-
ty” exists for the agent of mimicry, but rather that the prospect of self-dis-
closure as object, as a visible and knowable presence, is, for the moment, 
outside of the realm of concern. Instead, as Bhabha puts it, “the look of 
surveillance returns as the displacing gaze of the disciplined, where the 
observer becomes the observed and ‘partial’ representation rearticulates 
the whole notion of identity and alienates it from essence” (129 empha-
sis original). Against the colonial dynamic, in which the right to look is 
reserved for the colonizer, contestation is most effectively accomplished 
by the introduction of the mimicking gaze of the colonized. is act of 
mimicry operates as though from behind reflective glasses, asserts the 
capacity of the colonized as seer, precludes the possibility of seeing him 
or her (this eye can see but cannot be seen), and reflects the derisive gaze 
of the colonizer back upon itself simultaneously.
How, then, can the subordinate subject procure this disruptive 
power? We can find a clue in Walcott’s lament that so many “politicians 
are trapped in the concept of a world proposed by those who rule it, 
and these politicians see progress as inevitability. ey have forgotten 
the desperate authority of the man who has nothing” (“Caribbean” 5). 
What can he mean by this? By referring to those in power as “trapped” 
in their assumptions and in their conviction of “inevitability,” he pro-
vides us with an example of the Bourdieuian principle that “agents 
practice as irreversible a sequence of actions that the observer consti-
tutes as reversible” (Outline 5). In other words, only the subject situ-
ated outside of this dynamic has the liberty to perceive its potential for 
alteration. is is an illustration of the relation of knowledge to power: 
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because of their implicit investment in this paradigm, players in a cer-
tain field are lured (or bullied) by power to subscribe to that paradigm 
and not to think outside of that particular box “on pain of being ex-
cluded from the game” (Sociology 134). Because he is situated outside a 
group of subjects who, by virtue of their privileged status, are particu-
larly susceptible to taking the hegemonic doxa for granted, Jackson is 
able to gain insight into the reversibility of social mores, and sets about 
subverting them. 
Jackson’s subaltern position interacts in interesting ways with his rela-
tionship not only to more abstract social conventions, but also concrete-
ly with his metropolitan counterpart, Harry. According to Bourdieu, 
“‘interpersonal’ relations are never, except in appearance, individual-
to-individual relationships and…the truth of the interaction is never 
entirely contained in the interaction” (Outline 81). We can see this rep-
resented more or less literally in the fact that at multiple points Harry 
says that he wants to be able to speak “man to man” with Jackson, but 
power always remains a salient feature of the conversations that follow. 
And although Harry is the one who comes up with the idea of reversing 
the Crusoe and Friday roles in their pantomime, and Jackson is initially 
reluctant to take part in it, once he does agree it is Harry who backs 
out. He says, “er, Jackson. is is too humiliating. Now, let’s just forget 
about it and please don’t continue, or you’re fired” (140). He later apolo-
gizes for his bad behavior, “man to man,” and Jackson offers to help him 
transform his lonely, isolated life, if they can continue with the reverse 
Crusoe pantomime. Harry refuses. Jackson then replies
All right. Stay as you want. But if you say yes, it go have to 
be man to man, and none of this boss-and-Jackson business, 
you see, Trewe… I mean, I just call you plain Trewe, for ex-
ample, and I notice that it give you a slight shock….You see, 
two of we both acting a role here we ain’t really really believe 
in, you know….We faking, faking all the time. But man to 
man, I mean… (pause) that could be something else. Right, 
Mr. Trewe?
HARRY: Aren’t we man to man now?
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JACKSON: No, no. We having one of them “playing man-
to-man” talks. (144)
On one level, it is easy to suppose that this arises out of the confound-
ing influence of the characters’ social and political context. On another 
level, it is also apparent that they cannot speak on equal terms because 
they do not share a field; they are not playing by the same rules, nor even 
necessarily for the same stakes. Another way of approaching this issue is 
to say that Jackson and Harry do not share the same habitus. Bourdieu 
defines this as “the ‘feel’ for the game and the stakes, which implies both 
the inclination and the capacity to play the game, to take an interest in
the game, to be taken up, taken in by the game” (Sociology 18). In other 
words, the habitus may be seen as the body of unarticulated instincts, 
valuations, and so forth, that accrue over a significant period of time 
spent pursuing a certain set of (mostly unarticulated) goals and beliefs—
or, to return to more familiar ground, it is the set of inclinations that 
accrues while living with a certain doxa, which serve to reinforce our 
unarticulated commitment to the doxa. Harry does not grasp Jackson’s 
habitus, mainly for lack of experience with it, and can generally be said 
not to share it; Jackson may have the capacity to play Harry’s game, but 
he will not be taken in by it. 
One practical ramification of their lack of a shared habitus is the 
marked absence of mutual intelligibility, which quickly becomes evi-
dent. “One of the fundamental effects of the orchestration of the ha-
bitus,” Bourdieu explains, “is the production of a commonsense world 
endowed with the objectivity secured by consensus on the meaning 
(sens) of practices and the world” (Outline 80). ey lack this sort of 
consensus because the orchestration or “co-ordination”5 as Bourdieu 
terms it elsewhere, which would otherwise have brought about its 
semblance, is precluded by their lack of a shared, uniform habitus. 
Harry and Jackson lack coeval habitus because “[t]he homogeneity 
of habitus is what—within the limits of the group of agents possess-
ing the schemes (of production and interpretation) implied in their 
production—causes practices and works to be immediately intelligible 
and foreseeable, and hence taken for granted” (80). Jackson’s resist-
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ance—exemplified in periods where his performances are unintelligi-
ble and almost always unforeseeable—simultaneously signals, derives 
from, and feeds into his break with the dominant habitus.6 His resist-
ance reinforces itself, then, in a way that is similar to the “train bring-
ing along its own rails” which we considered earlier, in the sense that 
it provides the distance from which it is possible to continue in his 
critique. 
In addition to disrupting any points of confluence between himself 
and Harry, Jackson also exposes the arbitrary and constructed nature 
of the habitus in general. e habitus, as Bourdieu tells us, is in the 
business of making “coherence and necessity out of accident and con-
tingency” (Outline 87). It is the social capacity to turn even the most 
arbitrary or incidental of customs or beliefs into a matter of course, 
by shoring them up with a sense of consensus.7 Furthermore, a hege-
monic worldview “goes without saying because it comes without saying”
(Bourdieu Outline 167). e fact that its adoption is neither explicit nor 
examined is the main source of its power. is is “a world which has no 
place for opinion as liberal ideology understands it, i.e. as one of the dif-
ferent and equally legitimate answers which can be given to an explicit 
question about the established political order” (167–68). ere is “no 
place for opinion,” of course, because the doxa must be not simply the 
best, but the only answer—to a question that must go unasked—and 
alternative answers threaten both as rivals to the doxa and because they 
expose the openness of the question (168).
While he may not be able single-handedly to establish his challenges 
to the hegemonic understanding of linguistic, ethnic, and national iden-
tity as “equally legitimate,” Jackson nonetheless introduces something 
like a field of opinion, or instance of “competing discourses” through 
the very multiplicity of his performances (168).8 Another way to de-
scribe this would be as heterodoxy, or that which contradicts the doxa 
and thereby disrupts it, forcing it to shift into the less privileged position 
of orthodoxy, which must recognize its opposition. For example, after 
Jackson begins to illustrate the Crusoe-Friday role reversal too vividly 
for Harry’s comfort, Harry’s clamoring for the restoration of his author-
ity and position as master has become something like orthodoxy. e 
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master-servant dynamic to which he wants to revert has lost its sense of 
givenness, and he must now agitate for it:
HARRY: It’s not the sort of thing I want, and I think you’d 
better clean up, and I’m going inside, and when I come back 
I’d like this whole place just as it was.
JACKSON: You mean you’d like it returned to its primal 
state? Natural? Before Crusoe finds ursday? But, you see, 
that is not history. at is not the world.
HARRY: I just want this little place here cleaned up, and 
I’d like you to get back to fixing the sun deck. Let’s forget the 
whole matter. Righto. Excuse me.
As with other forms of orthodoxy, Harry’s need explicitly to express his 
wishes, which he was heretofore able to rely upon as a matter of course, 
not to mention the stridence of his insistence, calls into question the 
naturalness of his authority, and signals the weakening of his position. 
Jackson’s retort of “Natural?” may be read as a way of taunting Harry’s 
assumption that the imperialist power dynamic he wants is somehow 
natural, and of reminding him that it is in fact just the opposite. 
When discourse has been splintered into orthodoxy and heterodoxy, 
doxa can no longer reign. Bhabha explains, “a gaze of otherness, that 
shares the acuity of the genealogical gaze which, as Foucault describes it, 
liberates marginal elements and shatters the unity of man’s being through 
which he extends his sovereignty” (129 emphasis added). is “gaze of 
otherness” is so inimical to the doxa, Bourdieu would add, because, 
“nothing is further from the correlative notion of the majority than the 
unanimity of the doxa,” which can admit not even one dissident (168).
is interference in the monopoly of the hegemonic doxa is also akin 
to the power of “narrative,” or, in this context, testimony of the post-
colonial voice. Edward Said describes it as undermining the metro-
politan “vision,” or dominating conception and representation, of the 
postcolonial:
[Narrative] asserts that the domination of reality by vision is 
no more than a will to power, a will to truth and interpreta-
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tion, and not an objective condition of history. Narrative, in 
short, introduces an opposing point of view, perspective, con-
sciousness to the unitary web of vision; it violates the serene 
Apollonian fictions asserted by vision. (240)
It is because the power and authority of the doxa, and its attendant ha-
bitus, is so dependant upon the uniformity of their acceptance that the 
introduction of even one competing perspective can prove so radically 
threatening. 
is insurgent multiplicity also problematizes “legitimacy,” which 
Bourdieu indicates the “tacitly recognized” authority of the dominant 
party within a certain field (Sociology 70). While Jackson does not pre-
cisely claim the same sort of unquestioned, hegemonic legitimacy for 
any one of the identities he performs, mimics, or critiques, the very fact 
that he enters them onto the scene entails a competition of some sort. 
Certainly his performance problematizes the naturalness of the “given” 
identity categories previously assumed to be the only (coherent) op-
tions. By doing so, he enacts the “objective crisis” which Bourdieu sets 
forth as a requirement for the sort of true critique which we can observe 
in Pantomime:
e critique which brings the undiscussed into discussion, the 
unformulated into formulation, has as the condition of its pos-
sibility objective crisis, which, in breaking the immediate fit 
between the subjective structures and the objective structures, 
destroys self-evidence practically. It is when the social world 
loses its character as a social phenomenon that the question of 
the natural or conventional character (phusei or nomo) of social 
facts can be raised. (Outline 168–69)
In other words, social mores can masquerade as natural laws thanks to 
the veneer of self-evidence they get from their very hegemony, as well 
as from the social contract requiring all members of the society not to 
question their legitimacy, but to take them as a matter of course. When 
this social contract is disrupted or taken away, and when social mores 
may begin to be considered as matters not simply of custom, but also of 
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power, the seal of their self-evidence is broken, and questions surround-
ing their origins and intentions may be brought to light. 
But how is this social contract disrupted? Jackson seems to recognize 
that a legitimate language or system “produces the essential part of its 
effects by seeming not to be what it is” (Sociology 70). By repeatedly call-
ing attention to what is actually being said and done, beneath the façade 
that obscures what the system is not willing to admit, Jackson unmasks 
it and thereby deftly robs it of much of its power. As Bhabha puts it 
Almost the same but not white: the visibility of mimicry is always 
produced at the site of interdiction. It is a form of colonial dis-
course that is uttered inter dicta: a discourse at the crossroads of 
what is known and permissible and that which though known 
must be kept concealed; a discourse uttered between the lines 
and as such both against the rules and within them. (130)
So we can say that although Jackson explicitly exposes what “must be 
kept concealed,” such as in the “man to man” passage discussed earlier, 
Bhabha would say Jackson’s heterodoxy would be called mimicry when 
he simply uses the codes against themselves, playing with stereotyped 
speech and servile behavior in order to draw attention to Harry’s expec-
tations. is, too, can “bring the undiscussed into discussion,” as we see 
in passages such as this, after Jackson says “tradegy” for “tragedy”:
HARRY: You mispronounce words on purpose, don’t you, 
Jackson? (JACKSON smiles.) It’s a smile in front and a dagger 
behind your back, right? Or the smile itself is the bloody 
dagger.9 I’m aware, chum. I’m aware. 
JACKSON: e smile kinda rusty, sir, but it goes with the 
job. Just like the water in this hotel: (demonstrates) I turn it on 
at seven and lock it off at one. (144)
Perhaps the smile referred to here is another exemplar of mimicry: it 
is “itself…the bloody dagger” in that it reflects, rather than fulfills the 
imperialist desire for a smiling, subordinate subject. at is, the actual 
presentation of subordination is displaced by a mirror image of the 
problematic imperialist desire for it.
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Jackson is not complicit with the system of language as an indicator 
of social class position within colonialist frameworks. Instead, he paro-
dies the system, and reveals its weaknesses and contradictions, through 
intricately subversive mimicry. By contrast, the character of Harry ap-
pears very fixed, constrained within his single, monolithic position, per-
haps even approaches obsolescence. is can be seen both in terms of 
language use and in broader implications. Critic Patrick Taylor observes, 
“[Harry] continues to identify himself with this role [as hotel manager], 
and when the crunch comes, he sees himself as master. Jackson is very 
different. As a former calypso singer, he too is an actor. However, he 
never identifies himself with the role he is playing” (296). Huggan also 
contrasts Harry’s dependence on established forms and customs with 
Jackson’s independence and agency referring to an instance in which 
Harry mocks a particular symbolic act of Jackson’s (the killing of a 
parrot) as unoriginal. He claims it had been done before in European 
drama: “Harry’s recourse to the cliché of artistic ‘originality’…merely 
emphasizes his reliance on the stock formulas of English pantomime. 
Jackson knows how to manipulate these formulas to his own advantage; 
Harry seems only to be able to reiterate them” (650). Indeed, Harry’s re-
marks are reminiscent of Bhabha’s observation that, “in that other scene 
of colonial power, where history turns to farce and presence to ‘a part,’ 
can be seen the twin figures of narcissism and paranoia that repeat furi-
ously, uncontrollably” (132). Harry may stridently claim ownership of 
metropolitan conventions as his birthright, but he is bound by them. 
Jackson surpasses these conventions by demonstrating, through parody, 
his mastery over them. 
us, in Jackson we see a versatility and mobility, a power of disguise 
and of being unchartable, unfixable, on the ethnolinguistic matrix—a 
powerful resource for evading colonial control and domination, as it 
resists that very “epistemic, nomenclatural hegemony” which the latter 
seeks to impose (Jeyifo 378). Furthermore, since this linguistic mimicry 
is not usually inverted and, when it is, rarely carries broad social conse-
quences, this would appear to be a sort of power generally unique to the 
subaltern. In an important passage referencing both Bhabha and writer 
V. S. Naipaul, Huggan notes:
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e ‘mimic man’ takes up the metropolitan desire to hear the 
strains of its own voice—to witness the duplication of its own 
authority—but he then rearticulates that desire as parody. Like 
the parrot, he mimics His Master’s Voice only to mock it: the 
simulated obedience of mimicry is revealed as a form of cam-
ouflaged disobedience, a means by which the totalizing dis-
courses supporting colonial hierarchies of power are made to 
confront their own partiality. (645)
An important reason for which this power, tied with mimicry, may be 
endemic to the subaltern is that this desire, or rather, this demand, to 
see its voice duplicated in the subordinated Other is generally endemic 
to the metropolitan.
Huggan estimates that, according to Naipaul, an essential power of 
the “mimic man” may be that of “drawing attention to the fallacy of his 
own colonially constructed ‘obligations’” (644). It may be true, howev-
er, that Jackson’s linguistic versatility may not bring him the conferral of 
very much economic, social, or other capital in traditional Bourdieuian 
terms. But after all, he is not actually competing in the field so much 
as satirizing the game itself. rough his nimble and creative linguistic 
performances, he parodies winning power by seeming to seize it, but not 
actually doing so, or by seizing it in ridiculous ways, and then immedi-
ately releasing it. He is making fun of the rules themselves: 
JACKSON: Mr. Trewe? (English accent) Mr. Trewe, your scram-
ble eggs is here! are here! (Creole accent) You hear, Mr. Trewe? I 
here wid your eggs! (English accent) Are you in there? (132)
is playful, satirical sort of performance is what, according to Bhabha, 
“mimes the forms of authority at the point at which it deauthorizes 
them,” and as a result, “radically revalues the normative knowledges of 
the priority of race, writing, history” (131–32). Because of his subaltern 
position, Jackson can recognize and disrupt hegemonic axioms. And be-
cause he finds the game as such objectionable enough that he is willing 
to exclude himself from it, his speech executes a trenchant critique of 
traditional categories of ethnic and national identity. 
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Notes
 1 Bwana is the Swahili term for “sir,” and is used by Jackson to reference other co-
lonialisms around the (former) British empire, as he does more extensively earlier 
on: “in that sin, that never set on your empire I was your shadow, I did what you 
did, boss, bwana, effendi, bacra, sahib…that was my pantomime” (137).
2 Freud also notes, “What we are concerned with, then, is a number of prohibi-
tions to which these primitive races are subjected. Every sort of thing is forbid-
den; but they have no idea why, and it does not occur to them to raise the 
question. On the contrary, they submit to the prohibitions as though they were a 
matter of course and feel convinced that any violation of them will be automati-
cally met by the direst punishment” (21). is may further illustrate the overlap 
between the concepts of doxa and taboo.
3 I do not mean to claim that all forms and instances of mimesis on the part of all 
postcolonial subjects accomplish, or even necessarily attempt, subversion, but 
only that this intentional, critical mimicry does so.
 4 Again, I do not mean to apply this indiscriminately to all objects of the gaze, but 
Jackson does make a good example of such an agent.
5 e hyphen left in “co-ordination” is felicitous in that it suggests the sense of 
“ordained together,” and thus the deterministic character of the habitus. 
6 Unintelligible not in the sense that they are incomprehensible, but in the sense 
that they do not signify within the hegemonic system, that they do not corre-
spond with accepted identity categories. 
7 I put sense in italics here because it does not matter for our purposes if in reality 
everyone, privately, does not think or practice the notion or the custom in ques-
tion; all that matters is that we feel that “everyone does.”
8 Bourdieu writes, “the truth of doxa is only ever fully revealed when negatively 
constituted by the constitution of a field of opinion, the locus of the confronta-
tion of competing discourses” (Outline 168)
9 e word “bloody” here is used in the British colloquial sense—as in “darn”—
rather than literally; its pairing with the word “dagger” compels this clarification.
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